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The  aim  of this  research  was to  explore  and synthesise  learning  from  stakeholders  (NHS
dentists,  commissioners  and  patients)  approximately  ﬁve  years  on  from  the introduction
of  a new  NHS  dental  contract  in  England.  The  case  study  involved  a purposive  sample  of
stakeholders  associated  with  a former  NHS  Primary  Care  Trust  (PCT)  in  the  north  of  England.
Semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  8 commissioners  of NHS  dental  services
and 5 NHS  general  dental  practitioners.  Three  focus  group  meetings  were  held  with  14  NHS
dental patients.  All  focus  groups  and interviews  were  audio  recorded  and  transcribed  ver-
batim. The  data  were  analysed  using  a framework  approach.  Four  themes  were  identiﬁed:
‘commissioners’  views  of  managing  local  NHS  dental  services’;  ‘the  risks  of  commission-
ing for  patient  access’;  ‘costs,  contract  currency  and  commissioning  constraints’;  and  ‘local
decision-making  and  future  priorities’.  Commissioners  reported  that  much  of their  time
was spent  managing  existing  contracts  rather  than commissioning  services.  Patients  were
unclear about  the  NHS  dental  charge  bands  and  dentists  strongly  criticised  the  contract’s
target-driven  approach  which  was  centred  upon  them  generating  ‘units  of  dental  activity’.
NHS commissioners  remained  relatively  constrained  in their  abilities  to reallocate  dental
resources  amongst  contracts.  The  national  focus  upon  practitioners  achieving  their  units  of
dental  activity  appeared  to  outweigh  interest  in the quality  of  dental  care  provided.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
1. Introduction
In April 2006, primary care National Health Service
(NHS) dental services in England and Wales began operat-
ing under a ‘new’ general dental services (nGDS) contract.
Fundamentally, three major changes impacted upon NHS
dental services at this time. First, ﬁnancial resources for
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E-mail addresses: Richard.Holmes@ncl.ac.uk (R.D. Holmes),
jimmy.steele@ncl.ac.uk (J.G. Steele), cam.donaldson@gcu.ac.uk
(C. Donaldson), catherine.exley@ncl.ac.uk (C. Exley).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
0168-8510/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).D  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
NHS dentistry became overtly ‘cash limited’ [1] when
resources were devolved to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in
England and Local Health Boards (LHBs) in Wales from
the national budget. The devolution of resources and
decision-making responsibilities to PCTs and LHBs marked
the beginning of local dental commissioning which in
turn opened potential opportunities for the local priori-
tisation of resources [2]. Commissioning is the term used
to describe a ‘proactive strategic role in planning, design-
ing and implementing the range of services required’ [3].
Although this activity was  only introduced to NHS pri-
mary care dental services in 2006, NHS commissioning
in the whole of the UK began in the early 1990s when
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
h Policy
t
t
a
s
r
t
t
N
f
j
[
s
t
(
t
1
ﬁ
e
p
t
o
e
t
a
i
m
f
u
m
i
o
t
C
b
o
p
d
a
U
A
l
C
i
‘
b
s
n
N
i
d
a
p
t
b
t
t
gR.D. Holmes et al. / Healt
he purchaser/provider split was introduced as part of
he quasi-internal market. Despite devolution leading to
 divergence in the structures of the NHS and social care
ystems across the four nations of the UK, and a greater
esultant focus in each country on more local issues, the
erm ‘commissioning’ is still used UK-wide. Consequently,
he effectiveness of commissioning, the impact of wider
HS reforms and the performance of the NHS across all
our UK countries since devolution continue to be the sub-
ect of much research, analysis and cross-border learning
4–7].
The second change affecting primary care NHS dental
ervices in England and Wales in 2006 was the introduc-
ion of a new contract currency, the ‘unit of dental activity’
UDA). UDAs are the unit of currency for measuring the
ype of clinical activity performed by dentists within a
2-month contract for an agreed ﬁnancial value [8]. The
nancial value of a UDA varies between dental practition-
rs as a consequence of a decision to use a 12-month ‘test’
eriod during 2004–2005 as the basis for calculating den-
ists’ annual salaries. Differences in the volume and type
f dental treatment activity conducted during this refer-
nce period have resulted in the ﬁnancial value of one UDA
ypically ranging between £17 and £40 [8]. The UDA has
ttracted much criticism from dental practitioners who cite
nequity regarding variable UDA rates and a target-focused
entality which has often resulted in anxiety resulting
rom the ﬁnancial implications associated with contract
nderperformance [9,10].
The third signiﬁcant change impacting upon NHS pri-
ary care dental services in England and Wales was  the
ntroduction of a new patient charge system which reduced
ver four hundred different NHS dental charges to just
hree broad charge bands. The ‘NHS Dentistry: Patient
harges Working Group’ who developed these charge
ands involved both patient groups and representatives
f the dental profession [11]. There was a desire to sim-
lify patient charging and uncouple the direct link between
entists’ remuneration and individual items of treatment
ctivity. However, neither the patient charge bands nor the
DA system were piloted prior to their implementation in
pril 2006.
In 2008 the House of Commons Health Committee pub-
ished a highly detailed report on NHS dental services. The
ommittee found that in-house commissioning skills var-
ed greatly between PCTs and that too many PCTs were
not doing a good job’ [12]. The Government responded
y acknowledging the variable quality of dental commis-
ioning between PCTs, alongside other aspects linked to the
GDS contract [13].
In response to this report, an independent review of
HS dental services was commenced, and then published
n June 2009. The report called for dental contracts to be
eveloped with clearer incentives for improving health,
ccess and the quality of dental treatment [14]. A ‘staged
athway through care’ was suggested by the authors of
he review as a means of encouraging continuity of care
etween patients and dentists. Additionally, the review
eam reported ‘. . .there is some very good commissioning
aking place but it is by no means universal’ [15]. Evidence
athered since 2006 has indicated that measures used in 119 (2015) 1218–1225 1219
the nGDS contract have concentrated upon quantity not
quality [16]. From a resource allocation perspective, sev-
eral studies have also noted that the focus for some NHS
organisations has been upon day-to-day management of
existing contracts rather than the true commissioning of
dental services [17,18].
Since this study was undertaken, the former 152 PCTs
across England have been abolished and NHS dentistry
is now commissioned by one organisation—NHS England
(NHSE) with a regional structure. These developments will
be considered later in light of the results from this study.
However, whilst the organisational structure of dental
commissioning has now changed across England, the same
principles of commissioning apply.
Following introduction of the 2006 nGDS contract, the
parliamentary inquiry [19], the independent review of NHS
dental services [14] and three years of piloting, there is
now the prospect of a ‘reformed’ dental contract. The aim
of this paper is to synthesise the learning from stakehol-
ders directly involved, and explore the impact of the 2006
nGDS contract to inform the new plans for reform.
2. Method
2.1. Setting
The study was conducted in a large NHS commissioning
organisation (combining 2 neighbouring PCTs) in the north
of England.
2.2. Design and sample
To explore the impact of the 2006 nGDS contract upon
key stakeholders, a qualitative case-study design was  cho-
sen as there have been calls for case-studies to provide
the much needed exemplars to support social science [20].
Case study approaches can also facilitate the study of more
complex and integrated systems such as health care orga-
nisations [21].
The study involved three stakeholder groups: patients;
primary care dental practitioners and NHS commission-
ers. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups elicited
the opinions of participants about the nGDS contract and
local NHS dental services. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 8 of the 9 PCT staff members who  held
responsibility for commissioning local NHS dental services.
One senior PCT staff member declined to participate citing
pressure of work.
Two local public engagement groups were contacted
to represent NHS patients and service-users. Local NHS
dental practitioners were identiﬁed with the assistance
of the PCT’s dental practice advisor (DPA). A purposive
sampling strategy was  used to identify: dentists with vary-
ing levels of NHS experience; a combination of principal
dentists (providers), associate dentists (performers) and a
dental practice owned by a large corporate body. PCT staff
members were contacted by one member of the research
team (RH). Potential participants received a letter about
the study together with a detailed information sheet and
consent form.
th Policy1220 R.D. Holmes et al. / Heal
In total, 27 participants were recruited to the study: 14
local NHS dental patients, 8 local dental commissioners and
5 local NHS general dental practitioners.
2.3. Data collection
One member of the research team (RH) conducted all
of the semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The
interviews with NHS general dental practitioners took
place in their dental practices. For NHS commissioners,
interviews took place at the PCT headquarters. The focus
groups with patients were held in neutral venues. A pre-
piloted topic guide was used to prompt the interviewer
and this was modiﬁed during the data collection process.
Focus groups and semi-structured interviews were audio-
recorded and professionally transcribed verbatim.
2.4. Data analysis
Each transcript was reviewed against the original audio-
recording to ensure that the conversion of speech to text
had been prepared accurately [22]. Three members of the
research team then independently familiarised themselves
with the transcripts in order to build a provisional overview
of the emerging issues as proposed by Framework analysis
[23]. The data contained in the transcripts were then coded
line by line before being entered into a spreadsheet matrix
to assist in the identiﬁcation of themes. Data were ana-
lysed manually. Finally, the research team met  on several
occasions to agree the thematic framework.
2.5. Research ethics
The study received a favourable ethical opinion
(Research Ethics Committee Reference: 10/H0908/9) and
research governance approval was granted by the NHS
commissioning organisation involved. To protect partici-
pants’ anonymity, these organisations and the gender of the
stakeholders involved have been removed from quotations
within the Results section.
3. Results
Four themes emerged from the data: (1) commission-
ers’ views of managing local NHS dental services; (2) the
risks of commissioning for patient access; (3) costs, con-
tract currency and commissioning constraints, and (4) local
decision-making and future priorities. Verbatim quotations
are used as examples to provide context to the issues raised
by participants.
3.1. Theme 1: Commissioners’ views of managing local
NHS dental services
Dental contract management was driven by local com-
missioners who monitored practitioners’ ability to achieve
UDAs in compliance with national nGDS regulations and
their annual contract values. This target-based approach
appeared to dominate at the expense of other potential
performance indicators. 119 (2015) 1218–1225
Commissioners are focused very much on the number of
patients seen by a dentist, regardless of quality.  . .you’re
commissioning on units of dental activity and on the num-
ber of patients, not on quality or outcomes or prevention.
(ID6, commissioner)
Five years on from the introduction of local dental
commissioning, dental contract management (rather than
the true commissioning of dental services) continued to
dominate the workload of staff.
There needs to be a fundamental shift from administer-
ing contracts to commissioning them. . .there needs to be
more robust commissioning of dental services. (ID7, com-
missioner)
Nationally, there continues to be a concerted effort by
the Department of Health to continually increase patient
access to NHS dentistry. Consequently, for commissioners,
their focus appeared to revolve around achieving quantita-
tive access targets.
A lot of the problem has been. . .the focus on [patient]
access and people have taken away from that various
messages. . .some of those messages have been ‘hit the
numbers irrespective of the quality’, in other words it
doesn’t matter who you get in [to dental services], even
if they have no health care needs at all—that’s a ﬁgure you
can count. (ID7, commissioner)
However, in the north of England where this study
was  based, patient access to dentistry was arguably not
as severe as the problems experienced in the south of
the country. This led to a sense of frustration for some
commissioners, who found the unrelenting national focus
upon improving patient access at odds with the needs and
demands of the local population. In other words the central
demands were not aligned with local needs.
3.2. Theme 2: The risks of commissioning for patient
access
Access to NHS dental treatment was a signiﬁcant con-
cern for the patients recruited to this study. However,
participants’ concerns focused around having to travel rel-
atively long distances to access NHS dental practices as a
consequence of the large geographic area.
To get people from [location] to go to the dentist is
a nightmare because they tend to only go when the
tooth is absolutely killing them; they don’t do regular
appointments.  . .you’ve got to get two buses at least. . .you
don’t bother.  . .you’ve got to go further aﬁeld and people
are terribly parochial. (P4, NHS patient)
However, in contrast to the quotation above, a new
NHS dental practice had been commissioned locally but the
service ultimately failed, due largely to a low level of patient
utilisation. At a separate interview, a local NHS dental prac-
titioner wished to discuss this speciﬁc example.
I know the PCT have thrown a lot of money at the rural
surgeries. I think they had to close one in [location] because
they just didn’t have enough patients there. . .whereas they
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would have been a lot better off having given that money to
the city centre. People from outside the city can easily get a
bus here and they’re coming anyhow to do their shopping.
It’s not necessary to put all that money out in the sticks
for a service which isn’t going to be used. (ID2, Principal
dentist)
This example perhaps highlights issues associated with
atients’ propensity to seek dental treatment. However, it
s acknowledged that the use of resources by commission-
rs in this case was undoubtedly well intentioned and the
ssues at play may  well have been more complex than those
uggested above.
.3. Theme 3. Costs, contract currency and
ommissioning constraints
This theme consists of three sub-themes: (3.1) patient
harges; (3.2) contract currency (units of dental activity)
nd (3.3) factors impacting upon business.
.3.1. Patient charges
The patient charges associated with the three treatment
ands encompassed by the 2006 nGDS contract were a
ajor source of confusion for patients in this study. None of
he patients recruited were able to describe the NHS den-
al charge band structure. Of concern, were the number of
omments received about ‘additional fees’ added to ﬁnan-
ial estimates that were not recognised by the authors as
HS charges relating to Band 1, 2 or 3 treatments.
There always seems to be something sort of added on [to
the bill], like an x-ray, a scale. . .extras. (P2, NHS patient)
. . .then there’s the hygienist but they’re expensive, you’re
in maybe 15 minand they charge you 30 something
pounds”. (M3, NHS patient)
The confusion about NHS patient charges may  not have
een helped by some practitioners’ choice of terminology
ith patients.
. . .the company is keen to offer patients upgrades. We
don’t. . .necessarily call it private treatment. We  call it
‘offering them upgrades’. (ID2, Principal dentist, body cor-
porate)
.3.2. Contract currency (units of dental activity)
Commissioners acknowledged that because the ﬁnan-
ial value of UDAs varied signiﬁcantly across local
ractitioners’ contracts, this was often a signiﬁcant cause of
nger for many dentists. Consequently, UDA values fuelled
 perception of inequity amongst practitioners.
A UDA value isn’t the same or anywhere near perhaps what
another dentist would be paid as a UDA value. So, some
might be on £18, some might be on near enough £40 a
UDA in our PCT. (ID9, commissioner)
One practitioner on a low ﬁnancial UDA rate explained
ow this had impacted upon their clinical practise, as
atients with high treatment needs and requiring more
omplex restorative dental care must all be paid for within
 single Band 3 patient charge. 119 (2015) 1218–1225 1221
I’m seeing a lot of new patients. . .they need crowns,
bridges, dentures. . .I  can’t do anymore this month because
my laboratory fees are shooting through the roof. . .my  last
lab bill was £1,700 for the month.  . .I  can’t afford to do that
because that’s coming out of my wages. (ID1, dentist)
The UDA-based system reportedly caused varying
degrees of stress and anxiety for many NHS general dental
practitioners. This quote is from a body corporate employee
where the wider company applied pressure to practitioners
around achieving their contractual UDA targets.
The biggest concern is the UDAs because obviously the com-
pany look at targets and hitting target. It we’re not hitting
target then we’re deemed to be failing. It puts pressure on
the dentists. (ID2, Principal dentist, body corporate)
3.3.3. Impacts upon managing local dental services
Commissioners generally reported that they felt sig-
niﬁcantly constrained in their abilities to manage local
NHS dental services. It was reported that almost all of the
PCT resource available to fund NHS primary care dentistry
had already been allocated to individual practitioners’ con-
tracts as a consequence of the decision to remunerate NHS
dentists on their activity during the deﬁned ‘test’ period.
So, in reality, opportunities for commissioners to reallo-
cate signiﬁcant ﬁnancial resource from one contract to
another, or to commission new dental services, were rel-
atively limited. Resource reallocation opportunities only
arose where there were signiﬁcant contract breaches (e.g.
underperformance), when practitioners relinquished their
NHS contracts or when practitioners agreed to permanent
rebasing of their contracts. The following quotations from
commissioners provide evidence to support these asser-
tions.
Most resource is tied up, 90% plus is already tied up. (ID7,
commissioner)
The budget is really tight. The only way we are going to
get money is through rebasing contracts where people
are underperforming. . .so we’re ﬁnding out we’ve got our
hands tied really. (ID10, commissioner)
Although commissioners sought ﬁnancial ‘claw-back’
from practitioners who  signiﬁcantly underperformed on
their contracts, this in itself caused potential problems. The
resource released in these scenarios was  typically ‘non-
recurrent’ and available for use only in the short-term. This
reportedly led to perverse ﬁnancial situations.
We have too much non-recurrent money–we can’t spend
it in a sensible manner because if you say to a practice
‘have some money for a year’ what can they do? They can’t
employ staff. . .they can’t give a dentist a robust contract.
(ID6, commissioner)
The process by which the commissioning organisation
allocated ‘unspent’ UDAs as a consequence of dentists’ con-
tractual underperformance, was  unclear to the research
team as well as local dental practitioners. Unspent UDAs
are important marginal resource and they offer ﬂex-
ibility around commissioning. Commissioners reported
that ‘internal deliberation’ drove decision-making about
th Policy1222 R.D. Holmes et al. / Heal
unspent UDAs. However, general dental practitioners
believed there was room for greater transparency.
You always wonder about the transparency of UDA allo-
cation. How does it work?.  . .How’s the commissioning all
gone about?.  . .(ID2, Principal dentist, body corporate)
3.4. Theme 4. Local decision-making and future priorities
This theme concentrated upon engagement between
NHS dentists and commissioners (4.1), the decision-
making processes involving commissioners with respect to
resource allocation (4.2) and suggested future priorities for
local dental services moving forward into the future (4.3).
3.4.1. Engagement between dentists and commissioners
Local dentists acknowledged that the balance of power
was held by their local commissioning organisation.
It’s like what they say, goes. You have no negotia-
tion. Everyone is scared about not reaching their [UDA]
targets. . .I  ﬁnd that what the PCT wants to do, they’ll do.
(ID1, dentist)
In this study, engagement between the commissioning
organisation and local dentists was believed to have deteri-
orated since the introduction of local commissioning. This
had not been helped by the rapid turnover of local commis-
sioners.
I would say it’s got worse for a variety of reasons. . . there’s
been a problem with a lot of changes in staff. . .I  think there
were a lot of promises made. When I came into post a lot
of what I got was ‘well I was promised this would happen
- and it never happened’. (ID9, commissioner)
3.4.2. The decision-making process by commissioners
The level of detail provided by commissioners with
respect to decision-making about local resource alloca-
tion was disappointing. Only one participant provided a
brief overview describing how decisions were made with
respect to dental commissioning.
If the PCT has extra money, then cases are usually put for-
ward to use that resource. . .based upon an assessment of
need. . .if you look at the investment programme of the
PCT over a number of years we’ve put services into those
areas with high needs and a lack of services and they’ve
worked. . .to a variable extent. (ID7, commissioner)
The above quotation links to an earlier theme which
explored the risks of commissioning for patient access and
the complexities associated with locating new NHS dental
services to meet patients’ clinical needs. Under-utilisation
of new dental services by patients in some areas had clearly
resulted in variable commissioning success.
3.4.3. Future local priorities for NHS dental services
Commissioners were acutely aware of the current lackof focus in the nGDS contract upon measuring the quality of
care provided by dentists. Almost without exception, qual-
ity measures were highlighted as an area requiring greater
focus. 119 (2015) 1218–1225
I want to look at how we can pay dentists to provide a
quality service. . .access for patients is brilliant, but access
to a poor quality service, what’s the point in that?. (ID13,
dental practice adviser)
All stakeholders involved in this research agreed on the
need for more dental disease prevention activity within the
dental contract. The lack of ﬁnancial reward for dentists
undertaking prevention was  seen to be a major failing of
the current dental contract.
One of the big things that’s been lacking really is preven-
tion, because the prevention in the end will help. . .There’s
no incentive for them [dentists] to do it. Some will do more
than others because that’s what they’re passionate about
and some will say ‘well, I’m not getting paid for it, so I won’t
do it. (ID9, commissioner)
We  need more money spent on preventative
dentistry. . .early treatment is certainly more preven-
tative than later treatment.  . .catching children when
they’re young (F2, NHS patient)
4. Discussion
The three stakeholder groups in our study: patients;
dentists and NHS commissioners, universally criticised the
current dental system approximately ﬁve years after intro-
duction of the nGDS contract and local commissioning.
The main issues highlighted by participants will be con-
sidered below, in the context of key recent developments
in national health policy.
Around the time that our data analysis ended, the
Department of Health announced a pilot programme to
reform NHS dentistry by introducing a reformed contract
to reﬂect the changing oral health needs of the popula-
tion [24]. Since undertaking our research, the dental pilot
programme has provided substantial evidence suggesting
that practitioners and patients strongly support the new
preventive care based pathway approach, at least in the
early stages [25–27]. However, more work is required on
the development of the new dental quality and outcomes
framework (DQOF) and its contribution to practitioners’
remuneration [28]. Recently, the Department of Health has
announced its intention to test prototypes for a possible
new system incorporating a blend of activity, capitation
and quality payments [29]. Despite the need for more test-
ing, the contract reform programme does appear to be
attempting to address many of the areas of criticism raised
by stakeholders in this work, but the stakeholders also
identiﬁed areas that are more difﬁcult to address.
Prior to April 2013, 152 PCTs across England com-
missioned dental services in different ways. These
organisations were sometimes criticised for their variable
quality of commissioning [12,30]. With PCTs now abol-
ished, it remains to be seen how effective the new single
commissioning organisation (NHSE) will be, as much of
the day-to-day business of this large organisation is still
managed at local levels through Local Area Teams (LATs)
[31]. It is unclear at the moment, how effective LATs will
be able to be at managing resource scarcity. However, the
units of budgetary allocation should be much larger and
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he existence of one commissioning body should encourage
hole-England strategic planning and greater consistency
31]. This provides an opportunity for greater ﬂexibility in
ommissioning.
Research has highlighted that little is known about how
ffective commissioning is actually achieved in practice
32]. Consequently, it can be useful to draw upon sound
rinciples and learning from wider health care. For exam-
le, the effectiveness of future dental commissioning
rocesses could build upon and be measured against
he ‘principles of commissioning’ published by the Royal
ollege of General Practitioners (RCGP) [33]. The RCGP
ommissioning principles are based upon a collaborative;
ommunity focused; comprehensive and clinically-led
pproach to the development of services. Furthermore, The
ing’s Fund in its document ‘Transforming our health care
ystem’ outlines ten priorities for commissioners [34]. Two
f the ten priorities are highly relevant to NHS dentistry as
hey are directly linked to implementing evidence-based
isease prevention interventions on which the dental pilot
rogramme is also focused. Together, both the RCGP and
he King’s Fund identify the need to ensure sustainability
n the commissioning of health care services in response
o ongoing resource constraints and challenging organi-
ational environments. These commissioning principles
pply as much to dental services as they do to the wider
HS. Finally, set against the backdrop of devolution and
ncreasing policy divergence across the four countries that
omprise the United Kingdom [7], it will be interesting to
ee how the devolved nations view developments relating
o the dental contract reform programme as the prototypes
re tested.
The ﬁrst theme in our paper relates to commissioners’
iews of managing local NHS dental services. Key concerns
or dental commissioners included that their workload was
redominantly focused upon administering existing den-
al contracts. Similarly, achieving greater patient access
o services was perceived to be a higher priority (at the
ational level) than monitoring the quality of care provided
y NHS dental practices even where this did not always
lign with local priorities. The proposed DQOF, whereby
entists’ work is measured alongside the clinical outcomes
hey achieve for patients, provides a further opportunity to
hange the balance, but as the Department of Health accept,
here is a need to ensure that the right quality and outcome
easures are developed and reﬁned [35].
The second theme focused upon the risks associated
ith commissioning for patient access. In comparison to
he former PCTs particularly in the south of England, our
tudy setting did not suffer from signiﬁcant patient access
ssues because of a lack of local NHS provision or capacity.
nstead, there were signiﬁcant geographic barriers related
o rurality and the long distances that some patients needed
o travel to access services. The alignment of national
essages and local priorities could remain a tension
nless a balance is found. In addition to measuring ‘qual-
ty’, the two remaining core elements in the dental pilot
rogramme include ‘capitation’ (paying dentists related
o the number of patients under their care rather than
he numbers of courses of treatment they provide) and
registration’ (encouraging a partnership between patient 119 (2015) 1218–1225 1223
and dentist to facilitate health improvement over time)
[24]. Both elements have the potential to promote a
long-term professional relationship between patient and
practitioner.
The third theme relating to costs, contract currency
and commissioning constraints identiﬁed signiﬁcant issues
for all stakeholder groups involved in the study. Patients
reported an overwhelming lack of clarity about the differ-
ent dental charge bands and the ﬁnancial costs involved.
Dental practitioners criticised local commissioners for a
lack of decision-making transparency relating to the award
of non-recurrent UDAs and commissioners admitted that
their ability to commission local dental services was sig-
niﬁcantly constrained by national nGDS regulations. The
study ﬁndings support research which has highlighted
practitioners’ frustrations, resentment and reduced job
satisfaction since the introduction of the nGDS contract
[36,37]. In this study, much negativity centred upon the
use of UDAs as a contract currency, strengthening a percep-
tion that the contract was  little more than a target-based
system. Signiﬁcant variation in the ﬁnancial value of UDAs
generated considerable resentment and a perception of
inequity amongst practitioners.
The risks and challenges for dental commissioning in
the future are brought into sharp focus by our ﬁndings.
First, the ﬁnancial resources associated with primary care
nGDS services appear to be largely ‘locked’ within existing
contracts based in turn, upon the historic ‘test’ period. For
NHS commissioners, this has proved to be a very challeng-
ing starting point for the equitable commissioning of local
NHS primary care dental services. In April 2006, resources
may  not have been best placed (geographically) to meet
the needs of local populations, and our ﬁndings in this case
study suggest that commissioners have generally not been
able to reallocate NHS dental resources on a large scale
because of the nGDS regulations which effectively allow
practitioners to hold their NHS contracts in perpetuity
(subject to satisfactorily meeting their contractual obli-
gations). This is good for the individual small businesses,
allowing stability, but it stiﬂes the abilities of commission-
ers to address other priorities.
With regard to commissioning challenges, there con-
tinues to be signiﬁcant misalignment between what we
know will beneﬁt patients (for example, the application
of evidence-based disease prevention interventions [38]),
and a lack of ﬁnancial incentives for practitioners to actu-
ally deliver these interventions within the current contract.
Additionally, the contract currency (the UDA) has resulted
in a perception of inequity amongst practitioners. For those
dentists with a relatively low UDA ﬁnancial value, there
is explicit evidence from our study that this has impacted
upon their behaviour and clinical practise. Several dentists
were explicit that the ﬁnancial cost to the dentist of pro-
viding multiple crowns, bridges or dentures within a single
(Band 3) patient charge had made such dental treatment
‘uneconomic’ for practitioners to provide in NHS primary
care. In such cases, dentists clearly expected a more directly
proportional link between cost and payment for each item
of care.
The ﬁnal theme focused around local decision-making
and priority setting. Future priorities for commissioners
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and dentists identiﬁed a need to focus more upon the qual-
ity of dental care which the pilots are now taking forward.
All stakeholders recognised the need to make the preven-
tion of dental disease a higher priority. Early ﬁndings from
the pilot programme have reported that the management
of disease risk using a care pathway approach makes clin-
ical sense to practitioners and patients have responded
positively with respect to receiving personalised care plans
from dentists [25]. However, this can take more time and
therefore resource. If this is a priority there may  need to
be some difﬁcult decisions about what is not such high
priority.
There are some limitations associated with our research.
Although the study was conducted in a large former NHS
commissioning organisation, our results may  not have been
generalisable to other PCTs that existed across the coun-
try. For example, we have already highlighted that the
study setting did not reﬂect the signiﬁcant patient access
issues reported elsewhere and particularly in the south
of England. However, our research does support many
of the views identiﬁed by others since the introduction
of the nGDS contract. Indeed, one of the key ﬁndings of
this study is that over ﬁve years on, many of the same
contractual issues persist. There are a number of similari-
ties between participants’ views in this case-study and an
earlier qualitative dental research study conducted across
ten former PCTs in England [18]. Research is also explor-
ing the organisation and delivery of primary dental care
by comprehensively evaluating a blended contract model
compared to the existing nGDS contracts in one area of the
United Kingdom [39]. One of the strengths of this study
alongside the research ﬁndings we have presented is to
provide insight into the process of contractual change for
the stakeholders involved, prior to the implementation of
a reformed national dental contract.
5. Conclusion
This study marks ﬁve years on from the introduction
of the 2006 nGDS contract in England, yet commissioners
continued to report signiﬁcant constraints in their abilities
to reallocate resources between practitioners’ contracts,
largely as a consequence of historic funding decisions and
nGDS regulations. General dental practitioners’ contracts
resemble budget silos which are not generally amenable
to large-scale resource reallocation at local levels in the
absence of signiﬁcant underperformance or more serious
contractual breaches.
The national dental contract reform programme has the
potential to address some of the concerns expressed by
participants in this study. However it is unclear how NHS
structural reforms introduced since this study was con-
ducted, will address potential tensions between a national
commissioning approach for NHS dental services and the
ﬂexibility required by local commissioners. Similarly, at
local levels there needs to be a concerted move away from
focusing upon the day-to-day administration of existing
NHS dental contracts towards the more robust commis-
sioning of NHS dental services by NHS England’s Local Area
Teams. Despite these concerns, the national dental pilot
programme may  provide a long overdue opportunity to
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improve NHS primary care dental services for the beneﬁt
of patients, dental professionals and ultimately, tax payers.
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